Muslim communities and Islamic network institutions in Ukraine: contesting authorities in shaping of Islamic localities more

Oleg Yarosh, Denys Brylov Muslim communities and Islamic network institutions in Ukraine: contesting authorities in shaping of Islamic localities Over past two decades Ukraine experiences a steady growth of Islamic religious activity. The present day “Islamic revival” in Ukraine shares many similarities with its neighbors in Central and South Europe. In the first place, Islam in Ukraine is devel­ oping in a “minority situation”, when Muslim ethnic groups constitute only a very small part of the overall population of the country. Secondly, Ukraine has (as Bulgaria and Poland) a significant indigenous Muslim population. At the same time, the uniqueness of the Islamic revival in Ukraine stems from the fact of dramatic experiences of the Crimean Tatar’s deportation and repatriation. Therefore, despite the presence of a huge indigenous Muslim ethnic group in Ukraine, we should perceive Islamic revival in terms of “construction” rather than reconstruc­ tion. Islam in Ukraine does not develop in a monolithic form; more likely we should speak about recently emerged heterogeneous Islamic localities based on ethnic groups and institutional structures. Meanwhile, international network­structured Islamic institutions have a huge impact on emergence of transnational Muslim com­ munities in Ukraine. These network institutions represent different traditions, mis­ sions and organizational structures found among Muslim organizations in Ukraine. All of the network institutions referred to in this paper have global connections and influence across Europe. We should mention that this study does not attempt to cover the full spectrum of Islamic institutions in Ukraine. For example, we do not refer to such an influential network Islamist movement as Hizb ut­Tahrir due to the secrecy and conspiracy sur­ rounding this organization and its activities in Ukraine; instead, the primary focus of this paper is on major transnational network movements and local Islamic authorities on which we have reliable and verifiable data. Other Muslim communities and insti­ tutions are discussed in terms of their relations with the major ones. Following the notion by Talal Asad, we understand Islam as a concept for organ­ izing historical narratives, not the name for a self­contained collective agent (1986: 10). Therefore, Islamic discursive tradition is a tradition that relates itself to the found­ ing texts of the Qur’an and the hadith, to conceptions of the Islamic past and future, with reference to a particular Islamic practice in the present (Asad 1986: 14). At the same time, we understand “Islamic authority”’ as the power to define what belongs to Oleg Yarosh, Denys Brylov Muslim communities... Islamic tradition and what does not. Islamic authority is always socially organized and distributed among Muslim communities starting from its most simple and basic forms of parental authority to the most learned authority of ‘ulama. According to Asad, prac­ tice is Islamic if “it is authorized by the discursive tradition of Islam, and is so taught to Muslims – whether by an ‘alim, a khatib, a Sufi shaykh, or an untutored parent” (1986: 15). Martin van Bruinessen, while describing the processes of dissemination of Islamic tradition and production of Islamic knowledge in Western Europe, refers to dual trends of universalization and localization (2001: 3). Thus, universalization, as the first step of dissemination of Islamic tradition beyond the Arab cultural context, means “the separation of what was considered as universal in the Islamic message from what was contingent” and the second one, namely localization, consists of “adapting the universalized message to local customs and needs” (van Bruinessen 2001: 3). The present­day situation within Muslim communities in Ukraine to a large extend is shaped by the local Islamic authorities’ dispute about the “Islamic tradition”. The disputed matters belongs to the universalization and localization levels both, in other words, first line of the conflict lies between two main transnational network organizations and the second one stuck between one of the major network organiza­ tion and ethnic Islamic institution. 253 Islamic communities and institutions in Ukraine According to the data provided by Larysa Vladychenko (2011), the overall number of Muslim communities in Ukraine at the beginning of 2010 amounted to 1,208 (including 598 registered as legal entities and 610 unregistered), which constituted 3.4% of the total number of religious organizations in Ukraine. Vladychenko also indi­ cates a 2.2% absolute increase of Muslim communities in comparison with the previ­ ous year. When we approach the problem of the number of the Muslim population in Ukraine we should notice, that there is no direct data on quantitative composition of particular Islamic communities, because their membership is impermanent and fluc­ tuating. The only reliable method of counting is based on the data of the Ukrainian general population census. Thus, according to the last such census held in 2001, the number of Muslims by birth (ethnic Muslims) is 436 thousand, or about 0.9% of the overall population. The ethnic composition of Ukrainian umma looks as in table 1. Among other Muslim ethnic groups we should mention Turks 8,844; Arabs – 6,575, Kazakhs – 5,526; Tajiks – 4,255; Bashkirs – 4,253; Turkmens – 3,709. Also a large number among the 48 thousand foreign students in Ukraine came from Muslim coun­ tries, including Turkmenistan – 3,823 and Jordan – 2,566. Obviously, these data does not give the full picture of quantitative and ethnic composition of Ukrainian umma. For example, it does not include data on the number of Ukrainian and Russian converts. Nevertheless, it allows us to conclude that Ukrainian Muslim population is composed predominantly of Turkic ethnic groups. 254 Muslims in Poland and Eastern Europe Thus, Islam in Ukraine is represented by mono­ethnic communities in Crimea, South and South­East, and multi­ethnic communities at other parts of Ukraine. Table 9. Main Muslim ethnic groups in Ukraine Ethnic group Crimean Tatars Volga Tatars Azeris North Caucasian ethnic groups Uzbeks Number of people 248 200 73 300 45 200 13 903 12 353 Source: Государственный комитет статистики Украины (2001), http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua /rus/results/nationality_population/nationality_popul1/. The most important Islamic institutions consolidating a huge part of Muslim communities, are: the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Ukraine (DUMU) in Kiev, the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Crimea (DUMC) in Simferopol, the Spiritual Center of Muslims of Ukraine (DCMU) in Donetsk, the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Ukraine “Umma” (DUMU “Umma”) in Kiev, the Spiritual Center of Muslims of Crimea (DCMK) in Eupatoria, Religious Admi­ nistration of Independent Islamic Communities “Kiev Muftiat” (RANIO) in Kiev. Table 10. Islamic institutions in Ukraine Institution DUMU DUMC DCMU DUMU “Umma” DCMK RANIO Communities (% of total) 9,1 80,1 1,9 8,3 Ethnicity multi­ethnic Crimean Tatars Volga Tatars multi­ethnic Crimean Tatars Volga Tatars We should also mention independent Salafi communities in Kiev and Crimea and Shi‘a communities in Kiev, Kharkov and Lugansk.1 The total number of Muslim clergy in Ukraine is 528 (Vladychenko 2011). Of these, DUMC has 349, DUMU – 64, DCMU – 24, and other – 91. The significant part of Muslim clergy in Ukraine get their training abroad: in Turkish Islamic educational institutions, Al­Azhar University in Cairo, Islamic University of Medina, and Islamic University of Moscow, Lebanon. Some of Ukrainian religious schools student (tullab) 1 Восточноукраинский центр мусульман­шиитов, http://www.baitalzahra.org/in­ dex.php?razdel=1. Oleg Yarosh, Denys Brylov Muslim communities... get initial religious training in in Ukrainian schools (madaris) and complete their edu­ cation abroad. The present day system of religious education in Ukraine basically consists of two levels: — elementary weekend schools which correspond to some extend to maktab in Islamic countries; — secondary religious schools based on Turkish imam­hatip lisesi system (DUMK) and secondary Islamic school thanawiyat shar‘ia (DUMU; Bogomolov et al. 2005: 45): Table 11. Islamic Education in Ukraine Institution DUMU DUMC DCMU DUMU “Umma” DCMK RANIO Source: Vladychenko (2011). 255 Elementary schools 39 66 13 5 Secondary schools 1 5 1 – – 1 Number of students 82 204 – – – 27 Islamic institutions in Ukraine established in 2009 a representative body in order to coordinate their activities and mediate their relations with the State. The Council of representatives of Spiritual Administrations and centers of Muslims of Ukraine to the State Committee on Nationalities and Religions was formed by DUMC, Kiev Muftiat and DUMU “Umma”. According to its Statute, the Council is a voluntary rep­ resentative and consultative body of Muslims of Ukraine, which aims to: — Develop of the Muslim umma, as an all­Ukrainian and regional union of Muslim communities in Ukraine; — Strengthen mutual understanding and mutual respect among all Muslim organizations in Ukraine; — Coordination of interaction and dialogue between Spiritual Administrations of Muslims of Ukraine and Centers with state authorities and administration. The main objectives of the Council include: — Representation of interests of Ukrainian citizens who practice Islam; — Promotion of rights and influence of Muslim organizations in drafting and adoption by public authorities of public legal acts on matters relating to the religious life of its citizens. At the same time, the main reason for the creation of Council was a conflict relat­ ed to the quota for hajj for Ukraine in 2008, when it was distributed in a way favorable to DUMU. Notably, DUMU, despite an official invitation, has not joined the Council yet. 256 Muslims in Poland and Eastern Europe Regardless of the dissolution of the State Committee on Nationalities and Religions, the Council continued its work in 2011 as the Council of Muftis. The main agenda of the Council is preparation for hajj in 2011.2 Therefore, the organizational structure of Islamic institutions in Ukraine (Spiritual Administrations or Muftiats) in general outline follows the system adopted in Russia where such structures tradition­ ally served as instruments of state control over Islamic communities.3 These “Spiritual Administrations” represent hierarchical institutions, like Christian dioceses, linked to a particular territory within which they have full admin­ istrative and spiritual authority. These structures do not always correspond to the realities of Islamic life in “minority situation” and often contribute to the emergence of conflicts between Spiritual Administrations and Islamic network institutions over religious authority in a given territory. As we will see later on, some of such network institutions, as “Al­Ahbash” and “Al­Ra’id” create their own ‘Spiritual Administrations’ in order to empower and legitimize their presence in Ukraine. However, among all of the functioning spiritual centers the most influential and the most numerous are the two rival organizations – the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Ukraine and the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Crimea, which represent the traditionalist trend in contemporary Islam. Both these organiza­ tions came into being within the very first years of independence of Ukraine as a result of transformation of large regional subdivisions (muhtasibats) of Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of the European part of USSR and Siberia (SAMEUS), active since 1948 in Ufa. The third influential force active in the territory of Ukraine are the representa­ tives of the Islamic modernism, represented by the followers of the Society of the Muslim Brothers which legalized their existence as the Spiritual Center (the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Ukraine “Umma”, registered in 2008), acting previ­ ously as a NGO. In fact, most of the processes observable in the Ukrainian umma is taking place with the participation of these actors. The Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Crimea The majority of scholars assume that the mass islamization of Crimea started in the 14th century, when Islam became the state religion of the Golden Horde during the reign of Khan Uzbek. Sufi institutions played a significant role in this process and in following centuries. Crimean Tatars belong to Hanafi madhhab. Religious education was based on a three­tier system: mekteb, mektebe rushdiye and madrasa. Some 2 Notably, that Ministry of Hajj of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia reduced this year’s quota for Muslims in Ukraine from 500 to 200 pilgrims. See: Совет Духовных управлений мусуль­ ман Украины продолжит свою работу. 27.07.2011, http://ansar.ru/rfsng/2011/07/27/18573. 3 The first muftiat was established by decree of the Empress Catherine II in Simferopol in 1794, shortly after the Russian conquest of the Crimean Khanate, its legal status was formalized in 1831 and the next year the Tavrichesky Muftiat officially launched its activities. Oleg Yarosh, Denys Brylov Muslim communities... religious schools established by Sufi tariqas included Mevleviyya, Naqshbandiyya, Helvetiyya, Saadiyya (a sub­branch of Mevleviyya). Toward the beginning of the 20th century, the religious authority of Sufi shaykhs and conservative mullahs was challenged by the modernist Jadidi movement which was originally inspired by Ismail Bey Gaspirali (1851–1914). In 1884, Ismail Bey embarked on an ambitious educational reform that was to completely reshape Muslim education in the Russian Empire. Ismail Bey opened a series of “new method” (usul­i jadid) schools in the Crimea that were to spread throughout the Russian Empire (Williams 2001). After the Bolsheviks revolution and the Civil War (1917–1921), the Crimean Autonomous Socialist Republic was formed in 1921. Subsequently, there was a rise in active secularization that reached its peak in violence in 1930 – a time when almost all Muslim clergy was repressed, mosques and madrasas were closed, and many Muslim sacred places (azizler) were destroyed. The Muslim life in the Crimean Peninsula com­ pletely vanished with the deportation of Crimean Tatars in 1944. During the period of exile, religious activity of Crimean Tatars was in fact limited to the private sphere. This affected the level of Islamic knowledge and worship among the people. The religious rites were observed mainly by the older generations. Only a few graduates of mektebs acted as repositories of Islamic knowledge. Thus, Islam as religion was not able to influence the attitudes of the rising generation. Nevertheless, Islam was still expressed in ritualized narratives, festivals and life cycle events such as burials, birth, and circumcision, and marriage rites retained its role as an important element of national identity (Khayali 2000; Bogomolov 2004: 21–22). In 1991, similarly to Muhtasibat, the Kadiyat of the Muslims of Crimea (KMC) was organized, centered in Simferopol. In 1992, by the decision of representatives of Mu­ slim communities of Crimea, it was reorganized into an independent Muftiat of the Muslims of Crimea. These actions provoked outspoken displeasure of the Head of SAMEUS, Mufti Talgat Tadjuddin. In his telegram addressed to the Head of the Council for the Affairs of Religion he recommended that the registration of new Centers should be first consulted with the Main Muhtasibat Administration of Ukra­ ine (later reorganized into the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Ukraine). In disregard of that the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Crimea was founded on the rights of self­administration and complete autonomy, and has been registered as an independent Center. This very fact, according to the Crimean researcher Elmira Muratova, led to long­lasting tensions in the relations between the Centers in Crimea and Simferopol. According to the Statute, the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Crimea operates in concordance with the Revelations of the Highest and Qur’an, Muhammad’s the Prophet Sunna, shari’a norms formulated by faqih’s ijtihad, decrees and decisions by Kurultay of the Muslims of Crimea, respecting and following the national laws of Ukraine. The supreme authority of spiritual power is the Kurultay of the delegates of ministry and Muslim communities of Crimea, Plenum of the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Crimea, the Council of ‘Ulama and Mufti. 257 258 Muslims in Poland and Eastern Europe The Kurultay convenes once every five years and is considered to be valid only if representatives of no less than two thirds of all the communities of the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Crimea are present. It determines the program of the internal and external activities of the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Crimea, elects the Mufti and amends the Statute. For all period of Islamic revival on the Crimean Peninsula, four Kurultays of the Muslims of Crimea took place – in 1995, 1999, 2004 and 2008. The Head of the Muslims of Crimea is Mufti, who is elected for 5 years. He is also the imam­hatip of Simferopol, Bakhchisaray and Evpatoriya Mosques. Over a period of functioning of the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Crimea, three muftis were changed. The first one elected for this post was Seitdzhelil Ibragimov (1992– 1995). After him, the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Crimea was headed by Nuri Mustafayev (1996–1999). Since December 4, 1999 this post is held by Emirali Ablaev (Boitsova et al. 2009: 395). The overwhelming majority of religious organizations of the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Crimea is located in the territory of Crimea and brings together Crimean Tatars, which indicates its regional character and mono­eth­ nic structure. An officially declared goal of the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Crimea – “to unite the Crimean­Tatar people in the study of religion of Islam”4 points to this mono­ethnicity. The Crimean Muftiat recently issued a fatwa against inter­ethnic marriage: “Inter­ethnic marriages weaken our spirit, national sen­ timents, and lead to the emergence of generations unaware of their origins”.5 The everyday religious life of Crimean Tatars today is still organized predomi­ nantly around holidays (Uraza bairam, Qurban bairam, Khidirles bairam, Derviza bairam) and life cycle events, such as burials, birth, circumcision, and marriage. The popular Islam in Crimea preserves some elements of the Sufi tradition. One of these elements is the cult of sacred places, azizler. While some of these azizler are the sup­ posed tombs of Avila, most others are simply natural objects: springs, rocks or caves. One of the most popular azizler is a dervish graveyard at the former Mevlevi tekke at Eupatoria (Kezlev). Many respondents know stories about saints (aulia) and believe in saints’ intervention. In spite of the formal independence, the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Crimea coordinates its activity with the Majlis of Crimean­Tatar people that is headed by Mustafa Dzhemilev. The key role here belongs to the institution of the spe­ cial representative of Majlis under the Muftiat which to a great degree determines the religious politics via consultations with the administration of Majlis (Bogomolov et al. 2006). In ideological sense, the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Crimea is ori­ ented predominantly to Turkey. Strong connections are established with the 4 Принципы Духовного Управления Мусульман Крыма, http://qirimmuftiyat.org.ua /index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=28&Itemid=70&lang=r. 5 Принципы Духовного Управления Мусульман Крыма, http://qirimmuftiyat.org.ua /index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=28&Itemid=70&lang=ru. Oleg Yarosh, Denys Brylov Muslim communities... Administration of the Affairs of Religion (Diyanet Işleri Başkanliģi – Diyanet). Furthermore, Turkey has the largest diaspora of the Crimean Tatars. Henryk Jankowski (2002) notes that it counts about 4 to 6 million people. However, these evaluations may not be fully reliable. The Turkish Government (the Religious Foundation of Turkey, Ministry of National Education of Turkey in particular) actively aids the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Crimea by supporting projects on religious education and financing real estate development and reconstruction of cult­related buildings. Apart from the official structures, a religious organization Nurdzhular and its Head Fetullah Gülen maintain a presence in Crimea: in March 1995 he met with the Head of Majlis, M. Dzemilev, to discuss the construction of mosques, schools and high schools for Crimean Tatars in Crimea (Grigoryants 2002). The Turkish Foundation Aziz Aziz Mahmud Hüdai Vakifi of famous Turkish Naqshbandi Shaykh Osman Nuri Topbaş is actively present in Crimea since mid­1990s. It started with the construction of the Mosques, but today its activity is focused on religious training in Azov madrasa (Dzankoy region). Recently the politics of Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Crimea shows signs of an influence of Arabic Islamic centers, predominantly of fundamentalist and modernist trends. Thus, for example, the official website of the Muftiat informs that the Orthodox Schools of Teaching (‘aqa’id) of Sunni are Ash‘ari, Maturidi and Salafi ‘aqa’id, though the traditionalist trend in Sunni acknowledges only the Ash’ari and Maturidi schools.6 A significant part of Islamic life in Crimea thrives in the so­called ‘independent communities’. The Ukrainian legislation on religious and civil associations is liberal enough to allow them to operate without formal registration. Registration is needed only to obtain the status of legal entity. These communities provide an environment for operation of various international Islamic network organizations, such as Hizb ut­ Tahrir. Some of Crimean Islamic school graduates, as well as those who received their education abroad, joined these independent communities. As a result, the level of Islamic knowledge in these communities is much higher than in communities which are under jurisdiction of the Crimean Muftiat. 259 The Spiritual administration of the Muslims of Ukraine The second spiritual center in Kyiv has been formed collaterally and almost at the same time with the spiritual center in Simferopol. In August 1992 SAMEUS approved the establishment of the Main Mukhtasibat Administration of Ukraine and appointed Lebanon­born Ahmad Tamim to the post of imam­muhtasip of the Muslims of Ukraine (Chervonnaya 1997; Boitsova et al. 2009). By September 9, 1992 the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Ukraine has already been founded and registered as 6 Fatwa no. 878989 of the Egyptian House of Fatwa, http://dar­alifta.org/f.aspx?ID= 878989. 260 Muslims in Poland and Eastern Europe the religious organization by the Council for the Religious Affairs of Ukraine under the Ministry of Ukraine. This process was completed with the establishment of the Kyiv Muftiat in April 1993 – Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Ukraine, head­ ed by sheikh Ahmad Tamim – that became independent of Ufa. Similarly to the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Crimea, the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Ukraine represents the traditionalist trend in Ukrainian ummah and is based on the concept of “traditional” authority in Muslim community that presupposes the priority of the judgment of the religious teacher, shaykh. As a result the printed publications by DUMU emphasize the necessity of acquiring religious knowledge from an authoritative teacher: …Obtaining information from books cannot replace the teacher, especially at the level of getting primary, basic knowledge […] Most of mistakes in human beliefs stem from an independent study of books […] The greatest scholars of the golden age said: ‘Those who learn about the Words of the Prophet from books (and not from a teacher) are called scribes, not scholars’. (Знание о Боге 2006: 9) The Head of DUMU, Mufti Ahmad Tamim, is a typical representative of a tradi­ tional religious authority, who received his Islamic education in the framework of tra­ ditionalist model – at the Dar Al­Arqam Ibn Abi Al­Arqam University in Manbij (Syria) and at the Al­Imam Al­‘Uza’i University (Lebanon), where he defended his Th.M. thesis. He has the permission (ijaza) to translate Sufi tariqas of Rifa’iyya, Qadiriyya and Naqshbandiyya (at least of the two branches, in particular – Naqshbandiyya­Mujaddidiyya of Shaykh Ahmad Zulfiqar (Zulfiqar 2007: 185), hadiths of Zafar ‘Ali al­Nu’mani Ridawi and some other permissions on translating the Islamic sacred texts – from his teacher, the renowned muhaddith Abd Allah al­Harari al­ Habashi primarily (Биография муфтия Украины шейха Ахмеда Тамима: 3). However, unlike the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Crimea that unites Muslims basing on their ethnic affiliation (Crimean Tatars) and traditionally adheres to the Hanafi madhhab, DUMU follows the principle of trans­ethnicity by bringing together Muslims of different nationalities: not only the traditionally Muslim Crimean and Volga region Tatars, Chechens, Arabs, but also converts from among eth­ nic Ukrainians and Russians. Moreover, DUMU is a poly­madhhab association, including the followers not only of Hanafi and Shafi’i madhhabs, but of Maliki madh­ hab also. Moreover, DUMU is closely connected ideologically and organizationally with the Sufi network structure Al­Ahbash7 which upholds the rigid traditionalist position 7 In 1930 Shaykh Abd al­Rahman al­Ajuz founded Jam‘iyat al­Mashari‘ al­Khayriyya al­ Islamiyya (the Association of Islamic Charitable Projects, AICP). Its goal was the dissemination of religious knowledge. After his death, one of the students of Shaykh Abd Allah al­Harari, Shaykh Nizar Halabi, took over the lead. This greatly spurred the development of the Organization and soon it became one of the most powerful international Sufi organizations, better known as Al­Ahbash. See more detailed information at the website of the association: http://www.aicp.org. Oleg Yarosh, Denys Brylov Muslim communities... in issues related to teaching the faith, and stands in conflict with the modernist move­ ments of Islam (like the Muslim Brotherhood or Jama’at­e Islami). According to some studies, Al­Ahbash is a conglomerate of tariqas Rifa’iyya, Qadiriyya and Naqshban­ diyya, having strong connections with tariqa Shadhiliyya. As the main reason for the rise of this organization the researchers point to the reaction of Sufi community to the spread of Islamist structures, the Muslim Brotherhood and Jama’at­e Islami mostly, and different trends of Salafism in their effort to politicize Islam (Nizar Hamzeh and Hrair Dekmejian 1996: 220). It should be noted that according to an opinion popular in the Arabic community Al­Ahbash is a separate tariqa – Habashi (Amman Message 2006). The “father” of the movement is Abd Allah al­Harari al­Habashi, who was born in 1920 in Harar, Ethiopia (Kabha and Erlich 2006: 527). The headquarters of the Association are in Lebanon. The main direction of activ­ ity is the establishment of mosques and oratories. Al­Ahbash is famous for its close connections with the University Al­Azhar in Cairo, which allowed for recognition of Kiev Islamic University of DUMU’s diplomas by the Al­Azhar’s educational structure. This movement is supported by secular and religious authorities of a number of Arabic countries, for example – Jordan and Syria. Therefore, in 1995 in Jordan, by initiative of the Ministry of Wakuf, a rotation of Imams in mosques was initiated, and the follow­ ers of the Muslim Brotherhood were replaced by the followers of Al­Ahbash (Nachman 2005: 215). The Association publishes a monthly magazine Manar al­Huda since 1992; it runs a radio station “Nida’ al­Ma‘rifa” since 1998. Its followers are active users of Internet and own websites that spread the teaching of their ‘ulama, and polemics with the representatives of Islamist ideology. Moreover, Al­Ahbash is quite active in Muslim Diaspora in Western countries. Its European headquarters are located in Germany, but in the majority of Western­ European countries there are regional centers. It also maintains branches in Indonesia, Malaysia, India, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Syria, Jordan, Egypt, Canada, USA, Ukraine, and Australia. At the end of 1990 Al­Ahbash became one of the best organ­ ized international Islamic associations in non­Islamic countries, with more than quar­ ter of a million of followers (Kabha and Erlich 2006: 528). According to some researchers (Nizar Hamzeh and Hrair Dekmejian 1996: 221), the main features of this movement are as following: — in the issues of fiqh the followers of Al­Ahbash adhere to Shafi’i madhhab, but in Ukraine among the representatives of this movement there is a large amount of adherents of Hanafi (and Maliki) madhhabs. — in the issues of faith (aqida) habashites are the followers of the teachings of Imams Abu al­Hasan al­Ash‘ari and Abu Mansur Muhammad Ibn Muhammad al­ Maturidi (for instance, they stand by the opinion that Allah created good and evil, and all of the human actions are created by Allah, and human being “obtains” this or that action). — Al­Ahbash maintains a position of legitimacy of Sufism with its main rituals and practices, such as dhikr, ziyarat, etc. It needs to be noted that the question of a fully shari’a­based legitimacy of the Sufism has been positively solved in the form of fatwas by many Islamic scholars, most notably by Ahmad al­Ghazali (d. 1126). 261 262 Muslims in Poland and Eastern Europe American Islamic Studies researcher George Makdisi maintains that the question of legitimacy of Sufism has never appeared, because from its very conception Sufism has been closely connected with Islamic orthodoxy (1973: 155–168). — The movement does not accept the violent methods of Islamists. At present, their view is that there are no legal conditions for forming a Caliphate. Habashites are clearly opposing the practice of accusing the Muslims disgruntled by their system of infidelity (takfir), which is common among Islamist. Their background assumption is that a Muslim, who does not adhere to his/her duties, but accepts his misdoings, remains a Muslim, though a sinner. — Al­Ahbash does not recognize the Islamic nature of the main ideologies of “Islamism”, such as expressed by Ibn Taymiyya, Muhammad Ibn Abd al­Wahhab, Sayyid Qutb, Abu al­A‘la Maududi and others, blaming them of corruption of the foundations of Islam and perversion of Muhammad’s teaching. Al­Ra’id and the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Ukraine “Umma” The third main center in Ukrainian umma, apart from the described Spiritual Administrations, is a non­governmental organization, or to be more precise – the All­ Ukrainian Association of non­Governmental Organizations “Al­Ra’id”.8 This organi­ zation is an umbrella structure of the Association the Muslim Brotherhood, its Palestinian branch in particular. Because of its status – an NGO – for a long time “Al­ Ra’id” could not engage in religious activity. As a result of this situation, in 2008 the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Ukraine “Umma” was established on the base of this organization. It united Muslim communities that were favorable towards “Al­Ra’id”. As of 2011, the Association “Al­Ra’id” includes 20 NGOs, declares cultural, educa­ tional and charitable activity as its main goal, and provides help to the citizens of Ukraine regardless of their religious beliefs and ethnicity. In ideological sense, “Al­ Ra’id” is oriented towards Shaykh Yusuf al­Qaradawi and his European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR). Moreover, as the Head of “Al­Ra’id” Isma‘il Qadi con­ fessed in his interview for a Kuwait newspaper Al­Siyasa, all strategic questions per­ taining to the development of the Association are aligned to the decisions of the Ministry of Wakuf of Kuwait which is also one of the key donors of the organization.9 Other major donors include transnational Islamic organizations and charitable organ­ izations of the Persian Gulf countries, among them the Social Reform Society (Kuwait), the Islamic Relief (Great Britain), the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (Saudi Arabia), the Federation of Islamic Organizations of Europe and others. 8 Association “Alraid” (until 2007 – Interregional Association “ArRaid”) was founded in 1997 on the base of unity of Arab students of Ukrainian universities. The Heads of the organi­ zation were the representatives of the countries of Middle East and East Africa. The first Head, a Sudanese Mu‘az Abu ‘Ubayd was deported from Ukraine in 2001. 9 See: Ra’is “Al­Munazimat al­ijtima‘iya” fi Ukrania: al­Kuwait sharikana al­‘asasi fi taqdim surah al­Islam al­wasati ila Urubba, http://www.al­seyassah.com/AtricleView/tabid/59/ smid/438/ArticleId/95238/ren/r/Default.aspx. Oleg Yarosh, Denys Brylov Muslim communities... As to the links of “Al­Ra’id” to the Muslim Brotherhood, it must be noted that the prevalent majority of contemporary modernist­type organizations adopt the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood. This very organization predetermined the key tendencies observable today in contemporary Islamic modernism. The Muslim Brotherhood became one of the first in their organizational structure which performed the transi­ tion from a formed organizational and ideological core (Egyptian organization of the Muslim Brotherhood) to a more amorphous, decentralized, stalking network, actively increasing the number of units on a franchise­like principle. These units share the ide­ ology and common directives of the maternal organization and use its name as a brand, but in some cases they may not be connected to it directly. Muhammad Akif, ex­Head of Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and ex­Head of Islamic Center in Munich, explains the transcendental character of the movement: We have no international organization, our movement is founded on the base of perception of things. We are present in every country. People everywhere believe in the Muslim Brotherhood’s program. (Nechitaiilo 2007) These organizations vigorously participate in the political and economic systems of states; structurally follow the forms of parties and NGOs; have their own parliament fractions and control over mass media; have representations in International organi­ zations; and take part in global economic processes, forming parallel transnational communities. In this spirit, the Head of “Al­Ra’id” Isma‘il Qadi in aforementioned interview to Kuwait newspaper “Al­Siyasa” was bemoaning their so far unsatisfactory performance in political scene of Ukraine. 263 Conclusion The heterogeneous nature and inner diversity of Islam as a religious tradition is reflected in Ukraine in full scale. Despite a relatively small number of Muslims in the country, different and even contesting Islamic institutions are present, which makes Islamic tradition in Ukraine extremely polarized. Local conditions of Islamic revival (including religious, ethno­cultural and political), of constructing and reconstructing Islamic institutions, have shaped the understanding and practice of Islam among Ukrainian Muslims. On the other hand, these conditions are under the influence of international Islamic network institutions, bringing their disputes and feuds into the Ukrainian context. Currently there is no observable individualization of Islamic authority in Ukrainian umma, as is the case in the Western Europe (Frank 2006). In contrast, the majority of Ukrainian Muslims clearly identifies itself with Islamic religious centers and adheres to statements made by their leaders. Only a small number of regularly practicing Muslims shows ideological flexibility and attends mosques of different communities. 264 Muslims in Poland and Eastern Europe In this light, two lines of internal conflict are noticeable in the Ukrainian Islam: “universalized” and “localized”. The first line of conflict runs between the Islamist network institution of the Muslim Brotherhood represented in Ukraine by “Al­Ra’id” and DUMU “Umma”, and their Sufi­oriented rivals – “Al­Ahbash” network and the affiliated Ukrainian institution DUMU. The second is delineated inside Crimea, between mono­ethnic and politically motivated DUMK and DCMK which is strongly linked with DUMU. The religious authority in Crimea is fragmented, as may be seen, while in other regions the Islamic religious authority established itself already in a dis­ persed form. At the same time, in spite of a huge diversification of Islamic authority structures, the current situation in Ukraine is relatively stable in terms of doctrinal and ideolog­ ical aspects and positive development of missionary activities. Moreover, current con­ flict empower, above all, the network Islamic institutions operating in Ukraine, mak­ ing them an important structural element of the religious network in the global dimension. 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